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1.    Introduction 
There is a robust literature on how a nation’s infrastructure can promote economic growth,  
further the goal of poverty reduction, facilitate movement of people and goods, provide energy 
where it is needed, and improve a nation’s health.1 The literature also attests that although due to 
their varying starting points of their systems of public financial management that different 
countries go about the infrastructure process differently, there is also a common feature among 
countries in that the delivery of infrastructure services is inherently intergovernmental or “multi-
tier”.   These twin messages neatly frame the topic of this Symposium to one of the many areas 
of Dana’s expertise: the poly-centric (decentralized) nature of infrastructure assets that provide a 
range of services designed to meet basic, but at the same time, varied and complex, social and 
economic needs in a manner that addresses a multiplicity stakeholder interests.
2
    
Richard Bird frames decentralizing infrastructure theme by posing several questions:  which type 
of organization will design, build,   finance, and, eventually own an infrastructure project? Will 
that organization be a general or special purpose government, a regional public entity, a state 
enterprise or other agency reporting to government(s), or a privately regulated instrumentality, or 
a donor?  And, once those questions are addressed, who will then be accountable for monitoring 
the capital asset and who will the monitoring agent be accountable to? Once the monitoring 
accountability links are established, how is that monitoring be documented or measured?  Is 
infrastructure monitoring about tracking facilities maintenance (inputs)? Measuring a flow of 
services (outputs)? Or an assessment of a project’s   social and economic benefits and costs 
(outcomes)? 
3
 Or all of these?  And,   are decentralized agents capable to carry out the 
monitoring task? If not all, then which monitoring task(s) are they capable of undertaking and 
what is the practice?     
The focus of this paper is on the last set of these questions -- that of the capacity and the practice 
of decentralized infrastructure monitoring.  The experience and practice of low, middle and high 
income countries alike is considered. The paper is organized as follows: the next section, Section 
2, defines how infrastructure is defined for purposes here, and then proceeds to discuss where the 
monitoring of infrastructure fits into the broader activity of decentralized infrastructure 
management. Section 3 then lays out some of the “pre-conditions” for effective decentralized 
monitoring of infrastructure, leading to the conclusion that for many developing countries these 
pre-conditions are not satisfied and, thus, why in order to make useful statements about 
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure one turns to specific case studies for lessons learned 
from current practice. Accordingly, Section 4 focuses on a mix of illustrative  country practices 
on governmental monitoring of infrastructure that serve to reinforce the conventional view  that 
though there are  core lessons common to all intergovernmental societies, there is no single 
                                                          
1 Yilmaz, Vaillancourt and Dafflon (2012) , Ch.4 review the general case.  Martinez-Vazquez and Frank (this volume); Aschauer 
(1989), World Bank (1994) examine the case of infrastructure.    
2 Bird (1994);  NRC (1995). 
3 Bird (1994) 
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“best”  approach since each country faces different starting and end points to which they aspire.4 
Section 5 reviews selected non-governmental and civil society role in what the paper labels as 
decentralized “bottom up” monitoring.  Concluding comments are provided in Section 6.    
2.    Multi-Tier Infrastructure Management  
Definition and Scope  
The term “infrastructure” has been used in different ways by different authors in different 
contexts.  In this paper   infrastructure is defined as long- useful life publicly provided physical 
assets –capital spending --used in in economic production and by households.5 But even with 
that definition,   what counts as “core” infrastructure varies across countries and sectors.  Thus, 
for rural areas, local roads, irrigation networks, community water boreholes are core.  For urban 
systems facilities   such as inter-connector roads and highways,  tram systems, power and 
telecom, supply-to-point-of- distribution water systems, wastewater (sewerage and storm water), 
and street lighting dominate.  Complementing the focus of the   physical infrastructure as 
discussed here is the social overhead capital of schools, health clinics, general government office 
buildings, post offices, sports and entertainment facilities, fire and police stations, and prisons.  
 The infrastructure management process can be depicted has having two stages:  creation of the 
physical infrastructure (planning and implementation of infrastructure investment) and utilization 
of a physical asset: operation and maintenance of infrastructure. The monitoring activity partially 
overlaps the first stage (investment and implementation) and the entirety of the utilization stage 
(Figure 1).
6
 The   monitoring function overlays three activities: planning, implementation, and 
operation and maintenance (O&M). In multi-tier government systems, different   types of 
governments may be responsible for different functions. Some aspects of infrastructure 
management may also be taken on by non-governmental institutions; accordingly, both 
governmental and non-governmental monitoring will be discussed below.    
  
                                                          
4 Thomas   (2006). p.3 
5 Thus excluded from the discussion here is both the fully privately provided and the public-private partnership, also  important 
topics, but that are adequately discussed elsewhere; e.g., World Bank (1994) and Dannin and Cokorinos (2012).    
6 The questions of functional  assignment and finance are discussed by Bird, de Mello and Sutherland elsewhere in this volume.     
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Figure 1.  The Infrastructure Management Sequence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four Models 
For a   start in setting the intergovernmental (decentralized) monitoring context, four 
arrangements can be identified (Table 1). 
1. National planning and implementation, subnational maintenance. Infrastructure can be 
created by the national government and then transferred to subnational governments for 
operation and maintenance. Water infrastructure in Albania is an example of this type of 
arrangement. 
 
2. National planning, subnational implementation. Infrastructure can be planned by the 
national government and implemented by subnational governments. In Vietnam, for 
example, the central government sets investment priorities for most infrastructure 
projects while provincial and local (provincial)   governments act as the central 
government’s agents to implement the central decisions. As an agent the role of the 
province is to prepare investment proposals for central government approval.   
 
3. National goal setting, subnational planning and implementation.  Infrastructure can be 
created by the subnational governments according to the goals and plans of national 
governments. In People’s Republic of China   the central government sets investment 
priorities across and within sectors, including the setting of targets and timetables for 
infrastructure coverage in different classes of cities. Subnational governments implement 
the centrally established policies and standards, but may have authority to plan where and 
how the local infrastructure is implemented and maintained.  
 
4. Devolution. Subnational governments can make their own choice of infrastructure 
investment priorities and manage throughout infrastructure creation and utilization. 
However, the central government may have a role in planning and finance. The classic 
case that of the United States   with its 50 unitary “state” governments and its nearly 
90,000 local governments. Nearly three out of five of those local governments are special 
Infrastructure 
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Infrastructure 
Investment 
Implementation 
Operation 
(Service Delivery) 
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(rather than general) purpose governments, and of those, a fourth are organized as special 
districts for the sole purpose of the delivery infrastructure services as defined above.
7
       
 
 
 
Table 1.  Stylized Governmental Arrangements in Subnational Infrastructure 
Option Infrastructure creation Infrastructure utilization Example 
 Planning Implementation Operation & Maintenance  
1.  N N S Albania 
2.  N S S 
Sierra Leone 
Vietnam 
3.  N, S S S China 
4.  S S S 
Indonesia 
Philippines 
United States 
Note: N: National government, S: Subnational government 
 
 
The Monitoring Phase  
As depicted in Figure 1, the monitoring task begins once the planning and investment steps are 
completed. There are two aspects of the monitoring phase. 
 Monitoring implementation of infrastructure investment aims to ensure infrastructure 
projects are implemented on time, within budget and with the intended output goals met.  
Implementation monitoring thus focuses on cost, timeline and quality of infrastructure 
construction and, at its most basic level, requires comparisons of project progress against 
project plan. Accordingly, an effective monitoring process should be able to detect 
project construction cost overruns and delays in a manner that allows for timely 
corrective actions. 
8
      
  
 Monitoring operation and maintenance of infrastructure is to ensure that created assets 
achieve desired outputs and outcomes over their useful life, and that the assets are 
properly maintained over their life cycle. Monitoring infrastructure operation and 
maintenance focuses on output and outcomes of operation and cost of operation and 
maintenance, and at its most basic level, requires comparison of operation outputs and 
                                                          
7
 US Bureau of the Census  (2012) 
8
 Nonetheless, in even the most technically and administratively advanced of countries some timelines will not be 
met and cost overruns will occur. A cross-country study by the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative shows 
that more advanced countries like the U.K. have much lower cost and time overruns than developing countries like 
Ethiopia and Malawi. (CoST 2011). However, the evidence is not confined specifically to subnational projects. 
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outcomes against the infrastructure design. Accordingly, an effective monitoring process 
should be able to detect any underperformances and their causes so that relevant solutions 
can be made timely to restore adequate performance.    
Infrastructure can be monitored by those who plan, finance, manage, own and/or use the 
infrastructure, a division of roles that will vary by country and by sector.  In principle, the 
manner in how these tasks are arranged in a multi-tier system of government begins with the 
sorting out of   expenditure and revenue assignment arrangements as discussed by Bird, DeMello 
and Sutherland in this volume. Though there are generally accepted “assignment rules” for a 
well–designed (over time) multi-tier system, such sorting out will vary due to the political and 
fiscal architecture that is unique to each country case.
9
 Thus, in  some cases, the   parties that 
plan and finance infrastructure may also take on  the monitoring role  as in Vietnam whereby the  
central government not only  plans infrastructure projects, but then also  assumes the monitoring  
role that in other countries may be carried out by a  regional (e.g., in Vietnam, provincial) or 
local government. There are also countries such as Sierra Leone where the central government 
plans infrastructure, but then does not monitor local implementation of the plan.  And, in  
Albania  only localities that receive central subsidies for water infrastructure operation and 
maintenance report to the central government about their financial needs, though  with this 
arrangement is it is often the result that center  does not  receive full information it seeks.  
In   a devolved system like the United States (U.S), where central government directly accounts 
for only about 15% of total infrastructure investment, the central role is largely limited to that of 
monitoring environmental outcomes, a role that   often leads to the central government’s 
promulgation of national environmental standards and regulatory practices for projects that in the 
center’s judgment (which can be challenged in court) create negative externalities across state 
borders.
 10
 
And, in many countries the monitoring process can be heavily influenced  by civil society 
organizations   through mechanisms such as citizen “report cards” or other forms of citizen 
feedback activities (e.g., public hearings, establishment of  government established advisory 
groups). In Germany citizens can go directly to a readily accessible website of add their voice to 
the infrastructure monitoring process.
11
  This citizen/civil society role is further discussed below. 
3. Pre-Conditions for Effective Decentralized Monitoring  
 The   “Gaps to Solutions” theme of this book well fits the practice of decentralized monitoring 
of infrastructure.  But, in the context of decentralized governance, the gaps are not just that of the 
monitoring process per se; rather, the problem is that in many countries the infrastructure 
practice never even gets to a stage that permits a subnational monitoring role. To paraphrase 
Kornai, a   pre-condition for effective decentralized monitoring of infrastructure is that there is a 
                                                          
9
 Wallace (2003). 
10 U.S. CBO 2008: 4-5. See Kaiser and Vinuela (this volume) for cross-country data on governmental infrastructure spending. 
11 For the German practice see http://www.bmvbs.de/DE/Service/Baustellenmelder/baustellenmelder_node.html 
  Multi-Tier Monitoring of   Infrastructure: Top Down and Bottom Up   7 
 
 
 
well-designed, functioning of political and fiscal decentralized authority of infrastructure to 
begin with.  And, for that “well - functioning" system to be a reality, central and subnational 
governments alike must have developed the capacity to be intergovernmental.
12
  However, due to 
the reality that at present  much of the world , particularly the developing world, is still at the 
early stages of becoming intergovernmental, there is little evidence of effective decentralized 
monitoring other than the episodic.       
If one looks at a conventional textbook expenditure assignment matrix that links broad categories 
(e.g., water supply vs. distribution) on a vertical axis with generalized economic and engineering 
criteria for “which type of government does what”, the assignment of the monitoring 
responsibility seems to be straightforward. For example in the case of water supply and 
distribution, national (or maybe even supra- national) entities have the intergovernmental 
responsibility for water supply and subnational (e.g., local) governments take on the local 
pipeline/ water distribution role. That is the broad first cut at the question   of “which 
government” should then take on the monitoring function. 
But, as Table 2 reveals (and even here there is heroic simplification of the complexity of the 
nature of all the decisions that require monitoring by some entity or entities), when one gets in 
the “small stuff” there is no often bright-line between supply and distribution.13  Thus, in the case 
of water management the conventional assignment exercise would assign the monitoring of the 
source-to-distribution point of a water flow to a central or regional authority, with the local 
government then taking on the monitoring of pipeline distribution to households and businesses. 
But, upon a closer look when takes into account externalities (e.g., is the local tap water safe to 
drink so as to avoid bad regional health outcomes?).  It may turn out that the central (local) 
authority has a high monitoring interest in the occurrence of, say, local management of (central) 
pipeline leakage, reservoir/storage capacity, and water pressure. Similarly, the central (local) 
authority has a high interest monitoring water quality in order to be able to assess willingness to 
pay and, thus, the structure of general vs. user financing (Table 2).
14
   None of this is to say that 
these monitoring issues cannot be sorted out among governments, but rather to stress the point 
that to get it “right” will require both  central and subnational governments (and not just general 
purpose governments) to be intergovernmentally capable as a pre-condition to how monitoring 
will work in multi - tier systems. 
15
     
 
  
                                                          
12 Kornai (1992). 
13
  Gershberg (2006) provides a country illustration of this complexity for allocation K-12 education tasks among different types 
of governmental authorities.  
14
 The topic of financing infrastructure is addressed in this volume by de Mello.    
15 And add to this the reality of the asymmetric capacity to govern, let alone be intergovernmental, in many developing countries.  
See Dafflon (2006), 271-305 and Congleton (2006), 131-154.  
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Table 2.  An Illustration of a Conceptual Framework Checklist: Decentralization of the Infrastructure 
Monitoring Function 
Framework and System Inventory for Monitoring ←Who Monitors? → Monitoring Measures   
Generic Goals Decentralization: Determinant of  
Scale  and Jurisdictional Coverage    
Institutional 
Considerations 
Output Outcomes  
 Economic 
Productivity 
 Economic Health 
 Environmental 
Quality 
 Poverty reduction 
(distribution of 
flow of services) 
 Employment 
stimulus  
 
 System size 
 System cost 
 Degree of  cost recovery 
 Technology 
 Area of Extent 
 Distribution of general 
population 
 Distribution of poverty 
Population  
 
 
 Formal vs. Informal 
Institutions   
 Conventional vs. 
Traditional 
Governance 
 Collectivity: 
Governmental or 
CSO/CDD? 
 Political   “level” of 
government having 
a benefits    stake in 
the goals  
 Political: general or 
special purpose? 
 Availability   per 
unit of time (per 
unit of time such 
per hours; on 
demand?   peak?)   
 Technical 
productivity(output
/unit input) 
 User Satisfaction 
(and, thus, 
willingness to pay) 
 Safety 
 Environmental 
Externalities 
 
 Willingness to pay  
 User “report card”  
(formal and/or 
informal) 
satisfaction 
 Public health and 
safety  
 Environmental 
considerations 
 Equity 
(distribution of 
costs, benefits, 
consequences) 
Framework and System Inventory for Monitoring ←Who Monitors? → Monitoring Measures 
Water Supply & 
Distribution 
Goals 
Decentralization : Determinants of  
Scale  and Jurisdictional Coverage 
Institutional 
Considerations 
Output Outcomes 
 Provide adequate, 
reliable source of 
water 
 Ensure general  
public health 
 User safety 
 Access to 
Employment  and 
Schooling (& 
gender 
economics) 
 Access to poor   
 Meters and capacity protocols 
of   main supply system (e.g., 
pipeline) 
 Meters and capacity protocols 
of  local distribution systems 
 Treatment plants 
 Storage capacity 
 Reservoirs  (natural and 
constructed) 
 Pipe leakage   
 
 By system 
Ownership (by 
whole or parts; 
public vs. .private? 
 By agent that 
financed  the project 
plan and 
implementation 
 Service area users 
 General or special 
purpose government 
 Intergovernmental  
cooperative 
 Major users (e.g., 
industrial) 
 
 Gallons delivered 
 Pipeline Pressure 
(main supply and 
local distribution) 
 Storage rate (e.g.,  
% of    capacity to 
store) 
 Leakage/loss rates 
 Consumption per 
unit user 
 Financing: user 
charges vs. general 
finance  
 Lifeline user 
payment 
arrangements  
 Water pressure   
 Public 
health/disease 
incidents 
 Maintenance 
tracking/disruption 
of service rates 
 Poverty reduction 
service and 
catchment areas 
 Poverty reduction 
access to water (to 
the home?) 
 Willingness to pay 
 Economic growth 
and employment 
stimulus  
Note: This presentation is not designed for a bullet-to-bullet cross table reading. Thus, for example, the Column1 generic of employment stimulus 
may relate to one or more of the bulleted entries in columns 2-4. Source; Adapted from U.S. National Research Council (1995) 
An illustration for the lack of decentralized monitoring of infrastructure is found in the 
decentralization of the water sector in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. While some aspects of 
infrastructure management have been decentralized, monitoring responsibilities have not been 
decentralized accordingly. Based on the World Bank’s recent study of the   institutional 
arrangements in water infrastructure in   Eastern Europe and Central Asia, out of 19 countries 
surveyed, 17 countries have some aspects of decentralized infrastructure management (Table 
3).
16
   However, there is a disconnect between the type of government (typically subnational) 
authority that creates and utilizes the water infrastructure services  (Table 3, Columns 2 and 3) 
                                                          
16
 World Bank, Urban and Sector, Country Sector Notes, 2012.   Unpublished as of this writing. 
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and the authority, typically  national,   that monitors (Table 3, Column 4).   Moreover, only four 
countries, Albania, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and Turkey report that monitoring of 
infrastructure is part of the overall strategic planning process.  This lack of decentralized 
monitoring of infrastructure well fits the argument that if there are no pre-conditions for 
decentralization, one cannot expect to find a decentralized role for multi-tier infrastructure 
monitoring. 
Table 3. Institutional Arrangement in Water Sector Management , Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 2012 
Country Infrastructure 
Creation 
Authority 
Infrastructure Utilization 
(O & M) Authority 
Infrastructure 
Utilization Monitoring 
Authority 
Use of Monitoring in 
Strategic Planning 
Albania Regional Regional National Yes 
Armenia National National/Regional None NA 
Azerbaijan National National None NA 
Belarus Municipal Municipal None Yes 
Bulgaria Regional Regional National No 
Croatia Municipal Municipal National No 
Czech Republic Municipal Regional National Yes 
Georgia Regional Regional None NA 
Hungary Municipal Municipal National No 
Kazakhstan Municipal Municipal None NA 
Lithuania Municipal Municipal National No 
Moldova Municipal Municipal National No 
Poland Municipal Municipal National No 
Romania Municipal Regional National No 
Serbia Regional Regional National No 
Slovak Republic Regional Regional National No 
Turkey Municipal Municipal National Yes 
Ukraine Municipal Municipal None No 
Uzbekistan Municipal Municipal National No 
Source: World Bank, Urban Water Notes, 2012 (unpublished).  
Note: NA: Information not available 
 
Organizational Capacity  
The matter of becoming intergovernmentally capable enough to have a  discussion about 
infrastructure monitoring in multi-tier systems is not only about whether individuals in 
subnational governments are adequately trained for the task; rather, it is the failure having the 
organizational and institutional capacity in place for the system as a whole.  The World Bank’s 
Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) report on the evaluation of  the Banks’ support or 
10 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
capacity building found that “individuals are often trained for specific tasks before the 
organizational framework has been reformed to allow them to use the training effectively”.17  In   
short,  if a country is not broadly organized to be intergovernmental—that is, if its system of  
political and fiscal decentralization is flawed from the start in that the  fundamental questions of 
“which government does what” has not been  sorted out, well, then, so much for a decentralized 
monitoring.
18
   As Martinez-Vazquez and Frank note in their summary paper to this volume, 
such organization capacity is a “first aspect of the decentralization and infrastructure and hand”.  
Yes, there can be a deconcentrated dispersion of responsibilities to monitor within a central 
bureaucracy, and central-to-local agency delegation is also an option; but, from a conceptual as 
well as empirical perspective, this is not multi-tier or decentralized governance.
19
   
But, that said, for this discussion of infrastructure monitoring it is useful set aside the conceptual 
argument regarding the degree of organizational capacity required for a country to be 
“decentralized”   and accept the proposition that   if there is a degree of deconcentration and/or 
delegation with authority—that is, regional/local branches of central offices are created with an 
ability to make decisions independent of the center—there is, therefore, some degree of a de 
facto decentralization system.
20
  
Institutional Capacity  
Regardless of the degree of organizational capacity, the capacity to be decentralized—and, 
therefore, carrying out a decentralized task as key as monitoring of infrastructure-- is incomplete 
unless there is an institutional capacity to be multi-tier.  By institutional capacity, one is referring 
to   whether “the rules of the game” (e.g., relating to the assignment of the monitoring function) 
are linked with sustained performance of both entities responsible for service delivery (such as 
ministries and their agents, local governments) and individuals responsible for delivering results.  
21
  Now a   question is: what is the incentive structure of the local staff to effectively monitor 
local infrastructure to meet the interests and needs of their communities?   If in the end   the final 
reporting procedures and rules that the local-in-the field staff are those that 
address/promote/satisfy the goals of the central ministry or department, then for effective 
decentralized infrastructure monitoring to work there   must be the happy case that the goals and 
incentives of central ministry or department staff happen to coincide with the desired outcomes 
of the end users of infrastructure services.  However, the history of centralized governance leads 
one to conclude that there will likely not be such a happy coincidence.  A good illustration is that 
of the pre- 1990s socialist systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia whereby the policy of the 
central authority, the supra-national Soviet Union that planned infrastructure for its nation-states,  
                                                          
17 Thomas ( 2006), p.1; World Bank(2005).   
18  Ebel and Yilmaz (2007) and  Smoke, Kaiser and Eaton (2010) 
19  Not all analysts are willing to so readily to formally rule out deconcentration or delegation as viable forms of decentralization. 
E.g. see Amin and Ebel (2007) 
20  Smoke and Taliercio   address the nature of  “deconcentration” vs. “decentralization” for Cambodia. Smoke and Taliercio 
(2007),70 
21 Thomas (2006), p 2. 
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was to  build–but- then-ignore local infrastructure, with the result that the  pay and promotion 
incentive of the “decentralized’ (e.g., county) local field staff was go along with the same 
incentives as their central managers responded to.
22
        
But, one not need reach back to Soviet socialism to note this problem of a breakdown in the 
institutional capacity for effective decentralization of infrastructure monitoring.  The 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank reports that    “only about one third of 
the projects reviewed in Africa were clear about the relationships among organizational, 
institutional, and individual capacity.”23  In its work the IEG found that though a “lot of effort 
was devoted to   fixing weaknesses in organizational capacity, the main problem was poor   
incentives for staff” and, furthermore, that “individuals were too often trained for specific tasks 
without reforming the [institutional] framework to let them use the training effectively”.24 Thus, 
if one makes  what for many places is the heroic assumption that the organizational capacity for 
decentralization—and therefore decentralized monitoring—is in place, one  still runs into the 
problem of failure of the institutional to be effective. 
 The water sector in Albania provides a good example of how the lack of an institutional capacity 
to monitor locally.
25
 Albania initiated a process to decentralize the   water sector in 2000 when 
the Organic Law defined water sector service as a function of local government units.
26
 The 
principal mode of decentralization was the transfer of ownership of water utilities from the 
central government to local government units (LGUs). This was accomplished either by 
detaching rural independent systems from existing utilities and transferring them to the 
communes, or through direct investments in stand-alone systems in communes, financed by the 
central budget or by foreign donor organizations. Then the new systems were passed onto LGUs.  
By 2007, the decentralization was considered largely complete with 83 percent of the total 
number of utilities having been transferred, involving 76 percent of municipalities and 88 percent 
of communes, and serving 53 percent of the population.
27
  But, even though these organizational 
arrangements   were effected, performance of water sector did not improve after the 
decentralization.  Continuity of water service remains low, at only 11 hours per day, compared 
with Western European Benchmark of 24 hours per day. Utility staff per 1000 connections is 
about ten while the benchmark is only 2. Monitoring of water infrastructure has not improved. It 
was weak with the central government before decentralization and continues to be weak under 
the ownership of LGUs due to the lack of intergovernmental capability and institutional capacity 
to monitor. Two failures of institutional capacity   are particularly evident. First, a five-year 
business plan is considered as a benchmarking tool that would facilitate LGUs to monitor 
                                                          
22 Alm and Buckley (1994); Bird Ebel, Wallich (1995).   
23 World Bank (2005) 
24 Thomas (2006) 
25  This section draws on  World Bank (2011b) 
26 Article 10 of the Organic Law of Albania. 
27 However, the transfer of two of the largest water companies, Tirana and Durres, serving 37 percent of the population, has not 
been completed yet. Mayors of Tirana and Durres have refused to accept the utilities’ transfer without guarantees of ongoing 
financial support from the central government. World Bank (2011b). 
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performance of water companies. However, per the de facto “rules of the game” there is no legal 
obligation for water companies to prepare and submit such a plan to the central government or to 
the LGUs. Second, LGUs can monitor the performance of water companies against a 
performance agreement between an LGU and a water company; but, again, the de facto “rules” 
are such that none of the transferred water companies has concluded such an agreement with 
their LGUs because most LGUs do not have sufficient revenue to fund the operating and 
maintenance of water infrastructure.
28
 In sum, though the Albanians got the organizational 
framework ‘right”, there was no follow up to make the intergovernmental institutional 
arrangement capable of   carrying out its monitoring task. 
 
Individual capacity.  
Even if both the organizational and institutional capacity is in place, there remains the matter of 
the capacity of individuals—the staff—to be able to be decentralized.  In Nigeria the Lagos State 
government has attached high importance to monitoring and evaluation of infrastructure projects. 
Monitoring is primarily undertaken by the Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate in the state 
Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget (MEPB), and supported by the Project 
Implementation Monitoring Unit (PIMU) in the Governor’s Office and an Independent 
Consultants Monitoring Team.  
Implementing ministries, departments and agencies submit quarterly reports to the MEPB and 
PIMU and explanation is required for cost variances. MEPB and PIMU review project costs and 
benefits and make quarterly monitoring and evaluation reports. These reviews are, however, not 
as detailed as expected because of inadequate technical skills. Projects are to   be stopped if 
irregularities are discovered by the MEPB or PIMU, but this rarely happens. 
Despite Lagos government’s stated effort in improving monitoring, it is still weak as 
characterized by a low quality of monitoring reports. To compensate there has been a Personal 
Assistant to the Governor in infrastructure project monitoring and evaluation. Moreover, the 
Governor’s Office has collaborated with the World Bank mission in Nigeria to build the capacity 
of monitoring and evaluation of state Ministry of Economic Planning and Budget, and the 
Project Implementation Monitoring Unit (PIMU) in the Governor’s Office. However, low 
individual capacity still constrains quality of monitoring. 
4. Case Studies. 
As the forgoing discussion reveals, it makes little sense to talk of “decentralized monitoring of 
infrastructure”   in a country if the  pre-condition solutions involving organizational, institutional 
and individual capacity is not in place.  Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from both 
                                                          
28 World Bank (2011b). 
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“top-down” and “bottom-up” case examples—practices that the IEG notes that when it comes to 
the practice of project monitoring and evaluation, “can be more art than science”. 29 And, taking 
that cue, there are several case studies that give guidance of how one can move from gaps to 
solutions.  It is also true that in closing these gaps, there is opportunity for developed and 
developing to learn from each other. Though there are good examples of a well-designed 
intergovernmental  systems of subnational monitoring of infrastructure projects, there is also 
ample evidence of monitoring failures—or, at least  of the failure of policymakers to use the 
monitoring information presented to them-- in “advanced” decentralized countries (ASCE, 
2006).
 
 
 Adopting the same stylized format as above (Table 1) for  presentation  of multi-tier  
infrastructure and utilization arrangements, one can link the phases of creation and utilization  to 
that of monitoring (Table 4). Thus, for example, in   central officials coordinate  on infrastructure 
implementation and O &M, but then make monitoring a wholly central function (Table 4). In the 
Republic of  Korea (South Korea)   the role of which government finances is determinate  
whereby the central government monitors only the projects that receive large amount of central 
subsidy. In China, the central government is part of the planning process but, then does not 
generally monitor locally  implemented and operated infrastructure. The US provides the classic 
devolution case—four  “Ss” in a row. 
Table 4. Stylized Governmental Arrangements of Monitoring Implementation of 
Infrastructure Investment 
Infrastructure creation 
Infrastructure 
utilization 
Monitoring of 
implementation 
Example 
Planning Implementation 
Operation & 
Maintenance 
  
N S S N Chile 
N, S S S N, S South Korea 
  
N, S S S S China 
S S S S U.S. 
Note: N: National government, S: Subnational government 
Chile has a strong top-down monitoring of infrastructure projects.
30
 Project implementation is 
systematically reported and carefully reviewed as part of the budgeting process and  project costs 
are  controlled with   performance an effective use of performance budgeting.  This is 
accomplished by combining a   mature appraisal system for project design with a strong National 
                                                          
29 Thomas (2006), p3.  
30
 Arancibia (2013). 
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Investment System (SNI) that facilitates the monitoring of project implementation. The Ministry 
of Planning and Ministry of Finance jointly monitor project implementation through reports 
submitted by the financial unit in regional governments to the ministries and through the SNI. 
Implementing agencies in the subnational governments then report to the financial unit in 
regional governments about project implementation.  All information relating to investment 
initiatives and projects from formulation to appraisal and implementation is recorded in the SNI 
and posted in the Integrated Projects Bank (BIP).  This information includes a listing of contracts 
and the expenses with each expense item being paid out and the contracting company receiving 
(i) the payment; (ii) ex ante cost estimates; (iii) the requested resources by item, and (iv) the 
assigned resources. 
For sectoral monitoring and evaluation, a deconcentrated regional agency supervises and 
monitors the project implementation and the reports to relevant line ministry. For example,   a 
regional Health Authority monitors the implementation of infrastructure for health and reports to 
the Ministry of Health. For education, it is the Superintendent for Education that supervises 
project implementation and reports to the Ministry of Education. 
Regarding cost monitoring during project implementation, investment initiatives must be 
reassessed whenever the tendering process yields costs in excess of ten percent of the estimate.  
In this case, the institution formulating the project or the institution financially responsible must 
provide the analysis with all of the technical and economic information required to justify the 
cost increase. The project will then be re-appraised using the new information. Once the re-
appraisal is done and resources earmarked, the goal is for no further change in project costs.
31
 
In the Republic of   Korea, the central government monitors local infrastructure projects that 
receive more than 30 bn. Won (about 30 million USD) from the central government subsidy. 
Local governments as implementing agencies annually report to the Total Project Cost 
Management System in the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance then compares the 
project implementation status with the project planning for a given project and decides on the 
merits of further funding of the project. For projects that receive less than   ₩ 30 bn. the role of 
monitoring is assigned to local governments.  The Local Finance Law provides the legal 
framework for the local government monitoring of these projects. 
32
 
In the People’s Republic of China, growing reliance on extra-budgetary funds has reduced 
government’s control over spending units and, thus, local   accountability to the center.  33 Thus 
by default, China provides a   case which there has been decentralization of infrastructure 
                                                          
31 Chile, in which   the entire  infrastructure process is highly centralized, can be judged as having an advanced public investment 
management system. A recent study of a sample of 387 regional investment projects (eight percent of total regional projects) 
before 2007 
showed that only twenty eight percent of regional projects had time overruns and  actual costs at completion were five percent 
lower than estimated at appraisal. Arancibia (2013).   
32
 Kim (2013). 
33 Wong 2012. 
  Multi-Tier Monitoring of   Infrastructure: Top Down and Bottom Up   15 
 
 
 
(including   monitoring), but a decentralization that can be characterized having insufficient 
funding and little oversight.
34
 China does have National Key Construction Projects Monitoring 
Office with special agents assigned to each province to monitor selected projects for policy and 
legal compliance, disbursement of funds, project progress, tendering, and construction quality. 
However, their role is limited because   oversight is confined to only budget funded projects 
which are only a small portion of infrastructure projects in China.  
Local investment corporations (LICs)
 35
 have been established to provide funds for local 
infrastructure and have come to play a key role in financing infrastructure in many localities.
36
 
However, there is no systematic oversight, monitoring and evaluation of infrastructure 
investment by LICs.  According to Wong, “[a]t the national level no agency has been assigned 
the responsibility for oversight of their activities – not the Ministry of Finance (MoF), nor the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Construction (MoC) 
or the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC).  In the absence of national guidelines, 
management and supervision of LICs by local governments varies greatly across localities.”37 
In the U.S., a highly decentralized country, subnational governments typically manage local 
infrastructure investment from planning to implementation. Most of the states in the U.S. have an 
effective process for monitoring infrastructure construction. A recent   assessment on 
infrastructure performance in all fifty states finds that ten states have high performance on 
monitoring infrastructure construction, thirty eight at middle level and only two states at low 
ranking.
38
 The practice of infrastructure monitoring in the U.S. states reported during 1999 – 
2008 suggests that effective monitoring can be achieved when there is a comprehensive, frequent 
and systematic collection of performance data and effective use of the data collected in 
budgeting and intervening in project implementation. 
39
 
Some U.S. states improved their infrastructure monitoring between 2005 and 2008 by making 
more frequent reports and shortening time for corrective action. For example, project monitoring 
was much better in Wyoming state in 2008 compared to 2005 because its Department of 
Transportation effectively reduced the average time to correct problems from months to weeks 
since workers must now immediately notify project managers of problems or concerns. In Ohio 
state meetings are regularly held between project managers and contractors on the progress of 
capital projects who review   reports on cost overruns, delays and safety compliance. The result 
                                                          
34 Subnational government share of total budgetary investment has increased over the past three decades (up to 88.8% in 2007). 
Wong 2013a: 9. 
35 “By design, LICs are complex hybrid financial organizations that mix public (fiscal) and private (financial) funding to engage 
in both public and private (profit-making) activities.  As such, they bear similarities to public-private partnership arrangements in 
other countries.  In China, though, the government is the only participant and decision-maker.” (Wong 2013a:17). 
36
 “The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) estimated that LICs accounted for about two-thirds of local government 
debt in 2009. More recent estimates, based on findings by the National Audit Office and the central bank, is that the total debt of 
LICs is likely to have reached CNY 10 -14 trillion by year-end 2010 – as much as 45 per cent of current GDP” (Wong 2013a: 17-
18). 
37 Wong 2013a: 18. 
38 Pew (2008). 
39 Ibid. 
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is that the state architect is able to respond more quickly to solve problems, such as providing 
solutions   relating to inefficiencies,   quality issues, and cost overruns. The Ohio solution 
response time ranges from one to two weeks for (typically civil-engineer) identified efficiency 
and quality matters and to up to two months to address costs issues identified by financial 
analysts.   Alabama state improved its monitoring by focusing on collection of data on 
performance that allows quarterly adjustment for it performance budget reports.   In New Mexico 
state officials  instituted a  bottom-up  performance review process that includes weekly reports 
from project managers that allows the  state to respond within a week for most cost overruns, 
delays, inefficiencies,  and quality concerns, and, often within one day, for safety issues.
40
 
A recent survey of member states Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) finds that all national and regional governments answering the survey reportedly 
monitor implementation of infrastructure investment in one form or another.
41
  The majority of 
countries report (15 of 19 respondents to the survey)   that some forms of performance 
monitoring of public investment projects are conducted at central government level (Figure 2).
42
 
This includes the use of performance indicators as well as the formulation of objectives defined 
in form of target values.  An example is the Urban Solid Waste Management project Galicia 
(Spain), which is one of European Union’s (EU) pilot regions using outputs and outcomes 
indicators as a central mechanism for management infrastructure investment funded by EU.
43
 It 
is an example of a project subject to strong external constraints that have influenced its design 
and development. 
44
Monitoring requirements established for the  two major EU Structural Funds,  
the European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund,  often include reporting 
requirements, requirements related to the spending timeframe, the prioritization of policy areas, 
co-financing requirements, additionally requirements, the use of ex ante economic evaluation 
tools as well as the use of environmental impact analysis.45  EU practice is summarized in Box 1.    
 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 OECD (2012) and Charbit and Gamper (this volume). 
42 The survey question is “Do central levels or supra-national authorities monitor the use of public investment funding in your 
sector that goes to sub-national governments over the course of implementation?” One country may report more than one 
monitoring level.  
43 Hulbert (2012). 
44
 The project consists of the construction of a set of facilities operated by the private-public company, Sogama) in the 
municipality of Cereda, Galicia for the separation of recyclable materials and the incarnation of mixed waste with energy 
recovery.  With a project financing period of 1997-2010, the total investment costs were € 274 m (in €2011), 36% which was EU 
financed through the Cohesion Fund with the remainder funded by Sogama.  Sogama’s financing comes from its shareholders 
(which includes the government of Galicia) and through private loans (Sartori and Catalano, 2013 and CSIL 2012).  
45 European Commission 2012b. 
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Box. 1 Multi-Tier Monitoring in European Union Structural Funds 
The European Union Structural Funds are intended to reduce fiscal disparities   among the member states.  
These funds make up one of the largest items of the budget of the European Union (€ 278 bn. in 2013, 
which is about 28% of the committed Community Budget, and of that about a third is earmarked for 
infrastructure, largely for air, water, rail and road transport).   To monitor these funds, the European 
Council and Parliament define the priorities, tasks and organization of the funds, and make regulations 
through the ordinary legislative procedures   Monitoring of the EU structural funds is implemented in the 
context of multilevel governance and is based on output and result indicators.
46
 Monitoring of outputs 
means to observe whether intended services or products are delivered and whether implementation is on 
track with respect to a set   of common output indicators. Result indicators are variables that provide 
information on some specific aspects of results that lend themselves to be measured. 
47
  As a national 
policy, each EU Member State establishes   a committee to monitor implementation of each funded 
program in coordination with the    European Commission (the Executive   body of the Council). 
48
  At 
the subnational level monitoring procedures are program-specific and dependent on organizational and 
institutional settings of each member country. Galicia (Spain)   provides an example of a region that is 
applying outputs and outcomes indicators as a central mechanism for managing public investment funded 
by EU funds. Compared to national or local funds for public investment, the use of EU funds involves 
more extensive conditionality and monitoring, as well as a performance assessment report. Requirements 
attached to EU funds include reporting requirements related to the spending timeframe, the prioritization 
of policy areas, co-financing requirements, and the use of ex ante economic evaluation tools as well as the 
use of environmental impact analysis. This focus on conditionalities and the related monitoring 
procedures were judged as excessive by some Spanish authorities although there is agreement that EU 
conditionality, monitoring and performance evaluation has contributed to a stronger focus on results, 
particularly with respect to the main objectives of the closure of illegal landfills and the provision of a 
more environmentally sustainable waste management system in compliance with EU and Spanish national 
directives. The introduction of performance budgeting indicators in Galicia is further interpreted by many 
as a pre-emptive policy from the regional government that anticipates further EU requirements. 
Sources: European Commission (2012a, 2012b), Hulbert (2012), OECD (2012), CSIL (2012), and Sartori and 
Catalano (2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 European Commission (2012a). 
47 European Commission (2012b). 
48 European Commission (2012b). 
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Figure 2. Level at which monitoring is performed in OECD countries 
 
 
Source: OECD, 2012. “Investing Together: Meeting the Co-ordination and Capacity Challenges across Levels of Government”. 
A document submitted to Delegates of the Territorial Development Policy Committee for discussion and approval at the 28th 
session, OECD national questionnaire: multi-level governance of public investment in sectoral context, 2012. No Level refers to 
lack of response to the survey. 
 
Monitoring of regional infrastructure in non-OECD countries is less well established, which 
implies that the potential for indicators to inform policy and improve outcomes overtime is often 
not being realized in many developing countries. Indeed, the evidence shows that maintenance   
in the transport sector  in developing countries often suffered from underfunding and, in thus in 
part by default, neglect.
49
  The evidence    further shows that many countries in East Asia lack 
standardized performance monitoring.  China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and 
Cambodia are cited as countries that have not as yet established central institutions for   routine 
monitoring and reporting of infrastructure systems.
50
 
Measurement 
 As countries develop  the capacity to be intergovernmental and thereby make progress to toward 
multi-tier infrastructure monitoring, a task  to be managed will be that reaching of an 
intergovernmental agreement on   appropriate national and subnational guidelines, standards, 
indicators on progress, intended outputs and outcomes.  
Monitoring can be done according to mandatory standards, either absolute levels or as measure 
of improvement from a base line. In principle, mandatory standards can be used as a condition of 
capital grants; however, in practice such conditionality may not be applied   For example, the 
                                                          
49 World Bank 2003. 
50 Peterson and Muzzini 2003: 215. 
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Indonesia’s DAK (Dana Alokasi Khusus), a special purpose grant providing fund to subnational 
governments  that carried  with it a requirement for performance measurement,  nevertheless   
failed to incorporate standards in  account in the funding process.
51
 
The  selection of indicators and targets to monitor is the next important step if one is to capture 
intended  outcomes; but for this to work, subnational governments must not only have the “right” 
incentives to perform the monitoring role, but also be in a financial position carry out its 
monitoring task.   For example, at first glance Changsha,  the capital of Hunan province scored 
well when monitored on wastewater treatment by national and regional authorities,  but upon 
further examination of the operations,  it turned out that it was operating at only 50 percent or 
less of designed capacity due to lack of funds for operation and maintenance.
52
  This is because 
the higher level governments monitored only the infrastructure targets that were based on the 
treatment capacity of completed wastewater treatment plants, a practice that omitted the 
monitoring of volume of treated discharge or the quality of receiving water bodies. In this case, 
Changsha operated its current wastewater treatment plants at   half capacity by simply diverting 
the remaining incoming flows directly into the Xiang River (a branch of the Yangtze River)  at 
the same time that it was planning to build a new wastewater treatment plants with higher 
capacities. A similar problem arises when infrastructure targets such as   cost targets specific to a 
locality are   imposed by a “higher” level of  government  on a local government, but then some 
of the costs turn out to not be under  control of localities. 
Performance agreements can be arranged between central government and subnational 
governments, between governments and service providing companies. For example, in Sierra 
Leone, the Strategic Policy Unit in the President’s Office has performance agreements with 
ministries, departments and agencies. In Albania, local government units are supposed to have 
performance agreements with local-government-owned water companies so that they can 
monitor the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure performed by these companies. 
However, due to the lack of funding from the local governments to these companies, there has 
been no commitment from these companies to the local governments to report on the 
performance of these companies. 
Monitoring Tools 
Good practice suggests that the project planning and design should build in the monitoring 
criteria. Weak planning without requirements on monitorable outcome indicators, progress 
indicators and implementation beyond financing make it difficult for the government to monitor 
progress towards clearly defined objectives. In many    countries, however, the inclusion  of 
monitoring in planning is not common. For example, in the set of the nineteen Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia countries  surveyed by the World Bank, only four   have monitoring 
incorporated in strategic planning for water infrastructure (See Table 3). In a similar manner in 
                                                          
51 Peterson and  Muzzini 2003: 214. 
52 Peterson and  Muzzini 2003: 217. 
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Sierra Leone, the general lack of documented project objectives, projected timelines, and 
appraisal analysis makes it almost impossible to assess whether a completed project has achieved 
its intended objectives and whether the objectives were met on time at the approved cost.
53
  
Project reporting is   another   monitoring tool. It has been a good practice at subnational 
governments to have reports on the project implementation progress submitted frequently (e.g. 
quarterly) to a mayor.   Governor or other representative body in an understandable format 
accompanied by an explanation of delays, cost overruns, funding and construction problems and 
proposed corrective actions.
54
  Yet, in some donor dependent countries, it is hard for the 
government to monitor donor-financed projects because different donors impose their own 
reporting format and the often-weak-capacity government is not capable to issue and/or enforce a 
standardized reporting template. For example, in Sierra Leone, there are no national or sectoral 
project implementation manuals nor standardized reporting templates with the result of a 
monitoring system that is described very weak.
 55
 
Progress meetings between project managers and monitoring agencies have also been shown to 
increase the effectiveness of decentralized monitoring. In a study on public investment 
management that included   Arlington County, Virginia in the U.S,   Petersen and Vu found that 
weekly progress meetings held   between infrastructure project managers and the county finance 
officers resulted in an institutional ability to   address implementation problems in infrastructure 
project in a timely and effectively manner.
56
 
The site visit is a useful monitoring tool in verifying visible effectiveness of an infrastructure 
project and project reports. At the minimum, site visits would help detect such obvious problems 
as ghost schools and ghost hospitals in a number of developing countries.
57
 
Information system management   provides another monitoring tool whereby all (or, at least 
some core set) of information about infrastructure from planning to implementation and 
operation and maintenance is recorded. A “good” information system report for project 
construction includes project title, responsible department(s), and start date, estimated 
completion date, key contact people, percentage of completion, funding, and budgeted vs. actual 
costs.
58
 In Chile, all information relating to investment initiatives and projects from formulation 
to appraisal and implementation is recorded in the National Investments System (SNI) and 
posted in the Integrated Projects Bank (BIP). Many institutions interact within this system and 
take part in the process of public investment management. The Ministry of Public Works also 
uses the information recorded in the system to carry out its monitoring role. 
                                                          
53 Petrie (2013). 
54 Kaganova 2011: 44-45. 
55 Petrie (2013). 
56 Petersen and Vu (2013) 
57 There have been ghost schools and ghost hospitals in developing countries where school and hospital building projects are 
reportedly completed without the real construction of any school or hospital. (See Shah in this volume) 
58
 Kaganova 2011: 44-45. 
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Performance management systems for monitoring combine the audit function with statistical 
reporting. These have proved to be a useful monitoring tool, but can be difficult to establish at 
subnational government level due to capacity constraints.  Thus in China, although the National 
Audit Office has achieved remarkable success in pushing for performance management reform 
over the past 15 years at the national level, the progress in subnational government is limited due 
to a lack in many local governments of a staff that is  adequately trained in   performance 
evaluation. As a result,   monitoring and auditing is constrained to financial compliance rather 
than economic assessments, performance, and value for money.
59
 
5.  Bottom- up Monitoring: The Role of Civil Society   
Developing Economies 
Infrastructure management and monitoring may also be undertaken by citizens and civil society 
community organizations. In community-driven development (CDD) projects, much (sometimes 
all) of the management of the project from planning, implementing, operation and maintenance 
is done by citizen organizations.  Such   infrastructure projects are often of small scale and may 
receive support from international organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, and the United Nations Development Programme along with   support from 
bilaterals and the central or local government. And there can be a demonstrable efficiency gain.   
For example, Gross and others in their study on water infrastructure projects in 15 countries
60
 
found that access to community households to services was higher and the services are more 
sustained when women participated in monitoring project implementation.
61. 
  Local people 
including women have good local knowledge about what works and what can be sustained. The 
knowledge can be utilized when the agencies of water infrastructure projects “consult and listen 
to them, and give them some responsibility for and influence on the quality of project 
implementation”. 62 
 In Indonesia the  World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program  introduced a process for 
citizen choice relating to  small infrastructure projects for Indonesian sub- districts and as part  of 
that process explicitly  includes support for building the capacity for  community monitoring of 
the “quality and effectiveness of infrastructure projects” (Wong 2003).63  Moreover, there some 
                                                          
59   Wong 2013b. A Kecamatan is a sub-district of a city or regency, which are in turn  local government units of local 
government “below” the provincial level.  
60
 The study looks at a random sample of communities chosen from 18 projects in 15 countries, funded by a range 
of donors, NGOs and governments. The sample comprises 88 communities that had managed and sustained water 
supply systems for three or more years. 15 countries are from five regions: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in 
Latin America, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, and Zambia in East and Southern Africa, Cameroon and Ghana in West 
Africa,  Indonesia and the Philippines in East Asia, and India, Nepal and Sri Lanka in South Asia. 
61  Gross, van Wijk, Mukherjee (2001).  
62
 Gross, van Wijk, Mukherjee (2001): 20. 
63 The Kecamatan Development Project's objectives are to raise rural incomes, strengthen kecamatan and village government and 
community institutions, and to build public infrastructure through labor intensive methods. There are four components (i) block 
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evidence that the cost of monitoring   is less than that of similar construction projects run through 
a Ministry of Public Works contracts.
64
   
In the Bangladesh  a World Bank Social Investment   Program Project (SIPP)  was  launched 
(2003)     that supported  community monitoring through a citizens participatory  processes 
whereby information was collected regarding on spending  projects ranging from rural roads to 
tube wells.  This information is   publicly displayed in most villages and then communities 
graded   the performance of their Village Development Committees (VDCs) using a report card 
mechanism. A social accountability framework was established to allow community members to 
directly demand accountability from their leaders and service providers on infrastructure and to 
participate in monitoring their performance (Box 2).
 65
  
 
Box 2. Community Assessment Process in Bangladesh Villages    
Fewer than two World Bank projects, a number of villages in Bangladesh have been applying a 
Community Assessment Process (CAP) to assess the quality of public services including those of 
infrastructure. CAP is a process through which village people participate in assessing the performance of 
public services provided by their village committees and assuring the public services meet their needs. In 
the process, the village council (Gram Parisad) identifies the services to be evaluated, the service 
provider’s responsibilities, the planned and used resources, the outputs, and the indicators of performed 
service. Service providers and service recipients separately assess the performance and quality of public 
services through score cards in which they give scores to each of the identified public services, 
justification for the scores and recommendations for future improvement of the service. Service providers 
include Village Committee (Gram Samiti) and other committees such as Procurement Committee, 
Finance Committee, and Sub-project Committee. Service providers and service recipients (village people) 
present their score card results in a joint meeting with Village Council, discuss and agree on final 
assessment. Then, service providers and recipients jointly prepare an action plan to improve the services. 
Social Audit Committee monitor the implementation of the action plan and Village Council arrange CAP 
every six months.  
 
Source: World Bank, Social Investment  Program Project in Bangladesh (2009, 2011a)  
 
 
OECD Countries  
 
Non-governmental “watch dog” organizations may also play an important role in monitoring 
infrastructure that is managed by subnational governments. For example, in the United States, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
grants; (ii)  technical assistance for implementation; and (iii)  monitoring and (iv)   policy studies. 
www.worldbank.org/Kecamatan Development Project, May 13, 2013. Also see Wong (2003). 
64 Peterson and Muzzini (2003). : 215. 
65 Roughly two million people have been benefited from community infrastructure activities ranging from rural roads to schools 
and tube-wells.  
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well-funded non-partisan research foundation (Pew Foundation) conducts research and analysis 
to develop a dialogue on issues of state infrastructure management (Box 3).
66
  
 
Box 3. The Pew Performance Matrix, United States 
 
The Pew Center of the Study of the States   periodically issues infrastructure “report cards” on    all fifty 
U.S. states. Based on an explicit set of performance criteria, the grading has been done for four times in 
1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008 in four management areas—Information, Infrastructure, Money and People. 
Each of the four management areas received a score ranging from A to D (including the ten possible 
grades of A, A-, B+, B, B-, C+, C, C-, D+, and D). The PEW studies assessed state infrastructure project 
monitoring to determine whether a state has an effective process for monitoring infrastructure projects 
throughout their design and construction. The criteria included that of whether   a state (i) adequately 
monitors, evaluates and detects project-cost overruns, delays and safety compliance; and (ii)   effectively 
intervenes to take corrective action, as necessary, in managing the construction of capital projects.  Pew’s 
state-by-state surveys are carried out by journalists and academics and involve interviews of elected and 
appointed officials, questionnaires, and document reviews. The evaluations are based on data collected 
from more than 12,000 different sources—including surveys, written documents and interviews with over 
1,000 persons in all 50 states. 
 
Source: Pew Center on the Study of the States (http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org), Grading the States 
Report, 2008. 
 
Also in the U.S every four years  the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) releases an 
on-line  Report Card for America’s Infrastructure that depicts the condition and performance of 
the nation’s infrastructure in the familiar form of a school report card by assigning letter grades 
to each major type of physical infrastructure. The America’s Infrastructure Report Card   
organized by both by state and by type and mode of physical infrastructure.
67
 The Report Card is 
based on information for each of the infrastructure categories—including reports, studies, 
articles, surveys and other research materials—from professional societies, non-profit 
associations, and local, state and federal agencies. Civil engineers from across a given state then 
use these materials to develop a detailed picture for the state, examining the condition of the state 
infrastructure, its performance, funding and service capacity versus a measure of the capacity 
“need’.68  Based on an explicit set of engineering criteria, grades are then assigned to each 
category.  
The Report Card provides grades and details of the state of infrastructure in a given locality and, 
inter alia, estimates the costs to improve it for each category. Infrastructure categories examined 
                                                          
66 There are other assessments on infrastructure status and needs such as the American Society of Civil Engineers’ Infrastructure 
Report Card, and annual reports on infrastructure needs and surveys of major projects by the Urban Land Institute and Ernst & 
Young. 
67 ASCE Report Card, http://www.ascecareportcard.org.  
68
  A word of caution: The engineer’s measure of  infrastructure capacity “need”  (typically workload x average unit cost) may 
not the same as the economists concept of  quantity demanded for a flow of infrastructure services(which accounts for change in 
relative prices).   
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include transportation (roads, bridges, dams, levees and ports), waste, water (drinking water, 
storm water, waste water) navigable waterways, parks and recreation, rail, school, and transit. 
The ASCE has archives of report cards so infrastructure states for a given locality can be 
compared over time. 
A report card on infrastructure in a given state includes: 
 A summary of state of infrastructure and its need for renewal 
 A mini report card, a summary of grades given in each infrastructure category 
 A summary of justification for grades given in each infrastructure category 
 A Citizen’s Guide, a detailed report of facts and analyses for each infrastructure category 
and a guide for citizen’s understanding of infrastructure state of their locality and what 
can be done to improve it. 
Similar “watch dog” activities are occurring elsewhere. In 2012 in Canada a consortium of 
professional engineering associations and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities recently 
initiated  the Canadian Infrastructure Report Card project that surveyed municipal road systems  
and  water systems (drinking, waste and storm water)   in  123 municipalities in ten (10) of 
Canada’s 13 provinces. The Canadian report is instructive for other countries contemplating such 
“report card” monitoring in that because it was a first of its kind exercise for Canada’s 
municipalities, it provides in addition to its main report and analysis a concluding section on 
“Lessons Learned” regarding data requirements, data collection techniques, and how a survey 
process may have to be adjusted to survey communities of different size and degree of 
development.
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Two other countries that have developed community-based monitoring include Germany and 
South Korea. In Germany, as noted above, there is a government-issued website whereby 
citizens can provide their feedbacks on road construction across the country. .South Korea 
provides project information upon request according to Information Disclosure Act (a process 
that which often involves a long response time lag). 
 
6. Concluding Comments  
 Countries commit millions…billions…of capital investment monies on infrastructure.  The 
reasons are well documented: physical infrastructure is about a society’s foregoing of current 
consumption in order for future consumption. The societies that do this well become developed 
societies. Those who do it poorly are …poor. Thus launches the infrastructure management 
sequence: planning, implementation, operation and maintenance. Once one is past the planning 
stage, the need to integrate monitoring into the next three steps of implementation, operation and 
maintenance is crucial to making it all work. Quite simply, for  the capital investment to create 
                                                          
69 Canadian Infrastructure Report Card (2012).  
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that platform for development one monitor to learn if the   infrastructure management sequence 
is working effectively and efficiently to provide for the flow of services that become that 
platform for growth  and poverty alleviation. The history of the world is replete with societies 
that monitored infrastructure well and those that did not.   Again, as a generalization (but a 
reasonable one), to create, use and manage infrastructure well make a difference as to whether a 
country will be developed or undeveloped; rich vs. poor. 
Next the question arises: who monitors?  As adequately documented elsewhere in this book, 
spatial considerations reveal that except in a very few cases physical infrastructure has a multi-
jurisdictional character. Within a country (which is the frame of reference for this book and 
paper), that means that the monitoring task is inherently intergovernmental or “multi-tier”.  
Moreover, as again reported elsewhere in this book but also referenced in several places in this 
paper, the decentralization and monitoring of infrastructure has two types of payoffs. The first is 
political: decentralization of provides a political vehicle for citizens to engage with and hold 
accountable their government representatives. Indeed, in some cases—post conflict Cambodia is 
an example—decentralizing infrastructure can be a strategy for a recreate a people’s trust in the 
very notion of “their government”.  
The second is economic: decentralization of infrastructure can have high efficiency payoffs in 
terms of not the metrics of economic growth and poverty reduction, but also in the overall “well-
being” of a people. But, for this result to be realized, that infrastructure must be technically well 
monitored    throughout the infrastructure management sequence. Here it should be clearly noted 
that while decentralization of the infrastructure monitoring task has been shown to have payoffs 
in terms of sustainability and efficiency, decentralization is not the sine qua non for 
infrastructure generated development and poverty alleviation. It’s just that, as noted, it has been 
demonstrated that when a country is intergovernmentally capable, there are economic gains from 
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure. 
But, one of the clear findings of this paper is that many countries are not ready for decentralized 
monitoring. That is they have not met the “pre-conditions” of a well-designed (or, in many cases, 
even a partially well-designed) intergovernmental system:  there is   gap to be addressed in terms 
on of organizational,   institutional or individual (or all three) types of capacity development. 
This is the case for many countries.  And, even when a country might be judged 
intergovernmentally capable, it does not necessarily follow that it is getting its component of 
decentralized monitoring of infrastructure “right”.  Indeed, as pointed out in the above text, 
project monitoring can be more art than science. It can also be more opportunistic than “well 
designed”.  And with those lessons, one can draw some conclusions regarding decentralized 
monitoring of fiscal infrastructure. There are at five:  
 The first, which repeats the comments above, is that decentralized monitoring matters. There 
are, or can be, measurable political and economic efficiency gains. 
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Second, there should be clear guidance and standards for infrastructure monitoring at all 
government levels. When there is a national or regional interest in how an infrastructure system 
will work,   national/regional s standards and targets   should be discussed with the subnational 
governments to insure that if monitoring is to be decentralized that the decentralized monitoring 
unit can meet those standards and carry out its monitoring task in an autonomous manner.  In this 
context an example to avoid is that as cited in the text of a “local” staff that responds to central 
government incentives for salary and promotion. 
Third, decentralized infrastructure monitoring should be imbedded the full project management 
cycle so that there is a multi-tier agreement on infrastructure service modalities (e.g., timelines,   
funding, monitoring measures and tools, and outputs and outcomes). 
Fourth, recognizing that every decentralized infrastructure project or system is different in some 
manner than from all others, there are also many technical, political, financial, and economic 
similarities for knowledge sharing from place to place.  Different jurisdictions that have the same 
type of infrastructure investment may nevertheless have different monitoring strategies, 
measures and tools— and, that’s knowledge to be shared. 
And fifth,   community monitoring of multi-tier infrastructure can play an important role in the 
monitoring, and thus, the delivery, of infrastructure services and should be encouraged.  If 
governments and civil society agencies cooperate in providing   reliable information and 
feedback, the case for decentralized monitoring will be enhanced.    
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